Georgia, or Sakartvelo natively, meaning the ‘land of Kartvelians’, stands in a crucial corner geopolitically, with the nation directly between Europe and Asia, as well as energy pipelines from Russia through to Europe. In 2024, the Georgian people faced an ultimatum to choose between pro-Russia or pro-European parties during the parliamentary election. The Georgian Dream (GD) Party won by a narrow 54% margin that year.
Controversially, there is strong statistical evidence that the election was rigged; some election precincts had more voters show up than were registered, some had no information at all on voter registrations, and all of the dubious precincts had 70% or higher for the Georgian Dream Party.
In the 21st century, Georgia’s politics are extremely polarised; the most recent elections were characterised by widespread protests, opposition boycotts, and systemic violations.
Georgians have once again taken to protests to express their desire for political change.
Modern politics in Georgia
Even though Georgia has never actually achieved ‘liberal democracy’ status, it was considered a model for democratic reform, or electoral democracy. This seemed a real positive for a post-Soviet nation – though now, the country is experiencing a leap towards authoritarianism under the GD Party. Georgia achieving this status is very much a positive because its turbulent post-Soviet made democratic progress hard. Georgia endured a long period of unstable politics and as well as a severe economic collapse.
In V-Dem’s most recent democracy report, Georgia has now reached ‘electoral autocracy’ status, registering substantial overall decline by the end of 2024.
Furthermore, Georgia is shifting away from NATO and EU integration and towards closer ties with Russia and China. Georgia has postponed EU talks until 2028, following the EU’s rejection of the results of Georgia’s October parliamentary election. Despite this, in 2023, in an NDI poll on public attitudes in Georgia, 81% of Georgians stated that they support EU membership.
In the past 20 years, public opinion polls show that between 70% to 80% of Georgians favour EU and NATO integration. The GD Party denies any anti-Western sentiment and promised that Georgia will join the EU by 2030.
What this highlights is an increasing gap between public and state sentiments within Georgia – as well as wealth. Founder and leader of the Georgian Dream Party, Bidzina Ivanshivili, who owns an actual castle above Tbilisi, is recorded to have a net worth of $7.6 billion as of 2024, which is a quarter of Georgia’s GDP, a staggering figure.
The fragmentation of the opposition parties has left the public unable to vote for a credible alternative to the Georgian Dream Party, unable to unseat this ruling party since its power takeover in 2012.
Foreign policy drift
Georgia’s foreign policy shift away from Western integration is concerning. The Georgian Dream Party’s ‘Multi-Vector’ foreign policy has weakened Georgia’s position strategically, jeopardizing the country’s economic prospects and strategic security. Georgia’s capital Tbilisi is equidistant between Moscow and the West, though further headed towards geopolitical marginalisation.
This equidistant nature is highlighted not only geographically, but also in considering the party’s lack of trade reductions with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Though Georgia has claimed to comply with Western sanctions, they are still yet to impose them formally. Whilst the nation was once praised as a leader of democratic reform, it may now be weakening its international position through these choices.
Post-Ukraine invasion and the influx of Russian migration to Georgia
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, approximately 100,000 Russians fled to Georgia, with more following in September of this year after Putin’s announcement of a partial mobilisation as the war continued. A lower cost of living, no requirement for a visa, and a liberal reputation amongst young Russians meant that Georgia was a prime destination for Russian citizens. The reasonable cost of living and low regulatory requirements in the social and business spheres were also pull factors, making it easy to settle as a new citizen.
Many Georgians felt as though their government’s response to Ukraine’s invasion was overly passive, particularly considering previous Russian occupations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia itself. Russian citizens who fled to Georgia in 2022 are said to have experienced low-grade hostility from Georgian people. This is partly due to Georgian people seeing similarities between the previous invasion of their own country and that of Ukraine, responding by using minor protest mechanisms such as anti-Russian graffiti, and demanding for the new arrivals to prove that they are ‘good Russians’.
It could be argued that this is somewhat unfair to the fleeing citizens as many left because of disgust over the war, or over fear of repression.
Economically, the country has seen benefits from Russian migration. According to economist Davit Keshelava, Georgia’s GDP rose by more than 10% in 2022, with at least two of those percentage points being directly linked to the Russian influx. However, migration also accelerated pressure on Tbilisi’s housing market by creating a gentrification process, which in turn increased local mistrust and scepticism of the newly arrived Russian citizens.
This is somewhat due to the fact that most of the Russian migrants had economic independence, were young and educated, and possessed ‘urban consumer behaviour’, according to two quantitative surveys. This stands in opposition to the rest of the Russian population, and the local Georgian population. That being said, official statistics in late 2023 suggested that more than 30,000 Russians left Georgia from this year.
The significance of Georgian language and culture
The Georgian language belongs to the Kartvelian language group, a group that is unique for a variety of reasons – it is indigenous to the Caucasus, has no known relatives, and preserves some of the world’s most complex verb systems, (i.e. with few inherited adverbs most formed via case endings or special suffixes).
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According to UNESCO, Georgia is home to 11 endangered languages, with four of these belonging to the Kartvelian Language group, such as Mingrelian, Laz, and Svan. Nevertheless. Georgian is the main language used and the least endangered, as the others are not subject to official status or protection, though do hold strong regional identities.
The Georgian alphabet consists of three scripts: Asomtavruli, Nushkuri, and the most widely used, Mkhedruli, giving it a rich palaeographic tradition. It is one of the world’s few original scripts still in use. Historically Russian rule has tended to undermine the Georgian language. Soviet authorities and Russian imperialists have frequently attempted to erode Georgian language use in administration, education, culture, and even the military. Politically, the language reinforces Georgia’s legacy as an ancient nation, and underpinning national sovereignty. This promotes vital cultural resistance against wider Russian influence.
Will Russia’s nibbling method work on Georgia?
Russia’s long standing imperial ambition has led to the gain of regions such as Transnistria in Moldova and E. Donbas in Ukraine. The political trajectory of regions such as Transnistria have almost wholly been shaped by its absorption into the Russian empire in 1792. Transnistria is not portrayed so much as a natural separatist movement, rather as merely a geopolitical instrument of Russian power, pointing back to Russia’s desire to maintain its imperial sphere.
Transnistria can be seen as somewhat of a pawn for Russian nationalism and neo-imperialism. What is meant by ‘nibbling’ in Russia’s sense is small, incremental territorial gains, kept below the threshold of a full scale war. In the instance of Russia’s attitude towards foreign policy, it is mostly based on a conflictual stance towards the West. The Kremlin sees its justification for its gradual expanse of influence as a response to attempts by ‘unfriendly states’ to destabilise interethnic relations.
Historically, Russia’s foreign policy is also reliant on material, ideational, and institutional factors. Similar tactics were used in Russia’s advancements towards E. Donbas in Ukraine. Russia wanted Donbas for a couple of reasons, including mineral resources, and more importantly, strategically, the Port of Mariupol provides access to the Black Sea, which supposedly enables Russia to create some level of havoc towards the West.
So, will Russia’s nibbling method work on Georgia? Russian and other separatist forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have started to move fences, move away border markers, and erect new ‘State Border’ signs deeper into Georgian territory. Furthermore, Russia continues to occupy 20% of the territory in Georgia, with military bases in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. Though these things are somewhat powerless until Georgia’s internal politics shifts dramatically. This is due to the majority of public opinion supporting integration with the EU and a functioning central state. Though South Ossetia and Abkhazia are occupied by Russia, in the grand scheme of Georgia, they are perceived as already fractured and separatist, not reflecting Georgia as a whole.
What does a Georgia-based analyst believe are the biggest issues facing Georgia?
According to Irina Arabidze, a non-resident fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the centre for European Policy Analysis, who emailed me directly:
Going forward, Georgia’s central strategic problem is the risk of missing a narrow window for lasting Western integration – at the very moment when Europe’s post-2022 security awakening has elevated the region’s frontline states in a far more consequential way than in the aftermath of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. Put simply: the opportunity is real, but it is time-bound, and domestic politics could squander it.
Since the disputed October 2024 parliamentary election, Georgia has been locked in a prolonged political crisis marked by mass protests and escalating confrontation between society and the governing regime. The regime has crossed the line into outright autocracy – ramming through repressive laws, dismantling basic civil freedoms, and turning the courts and law-enforcement into instruments of political punishment to keep power at any cost.
In parallel – and alongside band wagoning with Russia – the regime has sought geopolitical alternatives, actively courting Washington’s adversaries by formalizing a “strategic partnership” with China and deepening political and economic ties with Iran, even as relations with the U.S. and EU have sharply deteriorated.
The regime has worked to paint the West as a source of instability and to blunt Georgians’ overwhelming support for Euro-Atlantic integration by manufacturing a false choice: “stability” under the current order or war. It repeatedly warns that any political change would trigger chaos or conflict, and frames Western pressure for reform as destabilising – leveraging the fear of war in a society still shaped by the trauma of 2008.
The longer this deadlock persists, the higher the strategic cost: Georgia risks squandering a generational opportunity for Western integration and sliding into a grey zone – effectively trapped in Russia’s orbit, with its sovereignty steadily eroded. Meanwhile, other regional actors are moving quickly to reposition toward the West, and Georgia could end up on the wrong side of a hardening divide.
The overall significance of learning about Sakartvelo
The nationhood of Georgia is built on deep cultural foundations. It is a case study as it showcases how modern imperialism works – the small increments of territory gain, the sustaining of separatist regions, and then the overall justification of interventions by Russia to supposedly try and stabilise interethnic relations.
