Lafarge began in 19th century France when the Pavin family started quarrying limestone on their land and sending it on barges down the Rhone. It was used in the construction industry across the Mediterranean and in French North Africa.
Taking risks and making profits
The World Wars were profitable for the construction industry, as destruction meant investment in reconstruction. By 1956, Lafarge was the premier cement company in France. By 2010, it was the second largest in the world. Bruno Lafont became its CEO in 2006. He enjoyed travelling to oversee the various cement works. He was particularly proud of his skills in risk analysis.
“An identified risk is no longer a risk…it becomes a problem to solve.”
(transl, quoted in Augier 2024).
The cement works outside France were owned by subsidiary companies. The Syrian company had multiple equity tiers but was still ultimately 99% owned by Lafarge. Investment for the venture came from Groupe Bruxelles Lambert, whose principal investor was Power Corporation of Canada, led by Paul Desmarais.
The mission of this company was “to increase value for shareholders. With sustained long-term growth of benefits and dividends” (Augier * p31). Desmarais and the investors were persuaded in 2007 to underwrite €6mn for Lafarge to buy Orascom, which had several cement operations in the Middle East. Then, the 2008 financial crash happened, and they found themselves with a large debt to finance.
A Syrian cement works of the highest standards?
In 2010, Lafont and Desmarais travelled to the Middle East to view their assets. Together with the French ambassador, they visited a site in the Syrian desert, some distance from Jalabiya. A few months later, a huge cement operation began to take shape there. Machinery came from Europe and hundreds of employees were recruited, some internationally and others from within Syria.
When challenged about setting up the operation in a country under the spotlight of Amnesty International for human rights abuses, Lafont replied reassuringly that the company had “a training kit on this.” At the joyful cement works opening ceremony, Lafont proclaimed that the establishment of the new site reflected confidence in the Syrian government. He also claimed the factory operated securely, to the highest environmental standards, and for the good of the local construction industry.
Lafarge cement workers in the Syrian war
As war broke out in Syria in 2011, most construction companies ceased cement production and prices exploded. The Lafarge cement works, in contrast, maintained its operations.
But this became increasingly difficult, particularly from 2013 when ISIS took control of the factory’s surrounding areas. Lafarge’s cement trucks and vans carrying its employees were stopped at checkpoints run by armed groups. Employees were abducted and tortured. Expatriate managers withdrew to safer places such as Cairo or Damascus, leaving local cadres to keep operations going.
This was a time when frightful atrocities were hitting world headlines, such as the beheading of journalist James Foley, and the killing of hundreds of Yazidi on Mount Sinjar with many more raped, tortured and enslaved. Cement from Lafarge was used to construct their torture chambers.
How Lafarge bought off terrorists
Lafont and his shareholders were desperate to keep production going because a merger with Swiss company Holcim was being negotiated, and the valuation of Lafarge was being calculated. Fixers including Firas Tlass, a Syrian national and Orascom investor who knew the decision-makers among the armed groups, and Waerness, who was employed to manage risks, stepped in to help.
They arranged what amounted to a speed-dating session for Lafarge directors and the armed groups. The aim was to find the right price to buy the groups off from harassing employees and pillaging the works. Meanwhile, the international merger with Holcim progressed, with the Syrian operation getting scant mention.
But by 14 September 2014, it became impossible for Lafarge to continue production. The Syrian employees who remained kept expecting the order to evacuate for their own security, but it never came. When only about 30 staff were still on site and the pillagers within shooting distance, the staff were saved by chance by a local supply van which was able to take them through the danger zone to safety. Only then did Lafarge’s directors announce the closure of the Syrian cement works.
Gathering concrete workers’ testimony
Those staff who could do so became refugees, some in Türkiye and in Germany. It was from these groups that the first testimony came to the attention of human rights organisations in Paris (Sherpa and ECCHR). They painstakingly collected testimony to begin mounting the case against Lafarge in 2016.
The book by Justine Augier about this case, Personne Morale (2024), is written as a legal thriller. She is a prize-winning novelist and knows how to spotlight the leading characters in a plot. The chapters move between the high life of the lead directors and investors in the offices and restaurants of Paris, the horrors that the local cement workers experienced in the Syrian desert and the diligent young female lawyers who gathered their testimony.
Building the legal case against Lafarge
English readers used to common law must note that French law courts operate differently. French law is based on statute. The first stage of the process is making a complaint that a person or persons has done something contrary to a specific statute. This is difficult for evolving law such as human rights. There is then a lengthy procedure of evidence examination before the complaint is accepted for public trial. So, it was a huge achievement for human rights lawyers when it was determined that the Lafarge directors had a case to answer in France.
But the Americans got there first, using anti-terrorism laws passed in 2000 and strengthened in a 2012 Act designed to counter the Taliban. In 2022, a case was brought against Lafarge (now Holcim) for financing Isis between 2011 and 2014. The company pleaded guilty and was fined $777.78mn. This was made up of $90.78mn in criminal fines and $687mn in asset forfeiture. There are still ongoing political campaigns in the US to get this money paid to the victims of terrorism, such as Yazidi survivors.
In the same year in France, the Court of Appeal upheld the charges against Lafarge for complicity in crimes against humanity. The basis of this decision was that the company had allegedly paid some €13mn to armed groups in Syria between 2012 and 2014. Four former directors and two Syrian intermediaries (including Tlass) were ordered to face a criminal trial. But the French Supreme Court dismissed the indictment on endangering the lives of workers on the grounds that French labour law does not prevail in Syria. Sherpa in Paris and the ECCHR in Berlin continue working towards justice for these ex-employees.
Human rights vs. money-making
In the final part of Augier’s book, a human rights campaigner reflects on how difficult it is to push for human rights when the demand for profit is so strong. If companies disinvest or suspend operations, as with Totale in Mozambique, others, such as Chinese companies, with apparently less focus on human rights, will replace them. She thinks that to advance both human rights and environmental concerns, it is necessary to reduce financial expectations. One thinks again of Desmarais and his decision-making being guided by what makes the most profit for shareholders.
Does ethical capitalism exist?
Is there such a thing as ethical capitalism? Lafont thought he was doing good developing cement plants worldwide. But shocking stories of the unacceptable face of capitalism keep hitting the headlines.
In my student days there were calls to disinvest in South African mining. In the 1980s (and still today), we see the shocking lack of compensation for the victims of the Bhopal explosion in India, the conflagration in a sewing factory in Bangladesh, the contamination of land by oil companies in the Niger delta, and the treatment of Uighurs in the Chinese cotton industry. To some extent it is true that if multinational companies retreat because of these horrors, worse options may replace them. We have seen this with informal mining in Congo and in old mining seams in South Africa.
The first criminal human rights case against a multinational will make a difference
But I do not think the difficulty of facing up to these harsh situations should deter us from exposing them or lawyers from advancing human rights cases. Gradually, decision-makers will be compelled to adapt and adopt more ethical practices. The first criminal case against a multinational on human rights grounds will influence the boardrooms and restaurants where deals are made. Some leading investors and directors will recall Lafarge and think more deeply about the implications of their decision.
Editor’s note *The source of many facts in this article is taken from the book Personne Morale by Justine Augier, 2024 (in French).
