For more than a decade European leaders took no notice of the warning signs of Russian aggression. Now is the time for Europe to return as the leader of democratic nations and oppose autocracy in any form, despite its own struggle with far-right leaders such as Orban. But tensions between the preferred policies of European leaders and that of the US have been appearing in various places of conflict especially in the Middle East
Syria and the humbling of the West
In August 2013 the UK and USA had a profound disagreement on whether to take military action against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria over its repeated use of chemical weapons against its own population. The following year Russia attacked Ukraine and took Crimea. After no action was taken by the west, Russia intervened in Syria in September 2015 tipping the power balance in favour of Assad. Europe was confused by Russia’s justification and real aims and failed to recognise the threat to its own security. Russia secured a Syrian air base at Latakia, where they introduced an advanced air defence system, and Mediterranean port at Tartus.
Tens of thousands of Syrians fled across the northern border to Türkiye, who responded by proposing a safe zone in mid-2016. But the US disagreed that it should include a no-fly zone. This continued after Donald Trump became US president in January 2017 and he withdrew US forces from the Syria and Türkiye border, against Pentagon and US intelligence advice, in October 2019. Türkiye responded by starting cross border operations in February 2020. This was followed by a further offensive, coordinated with Syrian opposition militia groups, in May 2022.
In November 2024 the rebellion against Assad’s regime started in Syria led by rebel group HTS, supported by Türkiye. The potential for persecution of Alawite sect supports of Assad, raised in my article Sunbird, has now resulted in execution of more than a thousand, in the region of the Latakia airbase and Tartus port vacated by the Russians. Now that this ‘operation’ is over, can Türkiye take advantage by using those facilities to import aid to re-build the damage Assad wreaked on his own country?
Trump Mk1, Iran and NATO’s nuclear dilemma
After assuming power from Barack Obama in January 2017, Trump expressed his concern that Iran was cheating on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed by the US, UK, France, Germany, China, Russia and Iran in July 2015. Its purpose was to limit Iran’s ambitions to build nuclear weapons. Trump’s concerns were echoed by Israel and the US withdrew from JCPOA in May 2018 and declared new sanctions on Iran. The European Commission disagreed as they wished to continue trading with Iran.
In September 2019 a drone attack on an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia was allegedly carried out by Yemeni Houthi rebels master minded by Iran as part of its plan to use proxy terrorist groups to pursue its ambitions. This was followed by a series of attacks on western shipping in the Gulf to which the US responded by missile strikes against Iranian-backed militias and killing Iran’s top general. US and European differences of opinion on how to deal with significant threats grew.
The NATO (US, UK and France) deterrent effect was weakened exactly as Vladimir Putin would have wished. Trump continued to make decisions without consulting Europe and sent mixed messages about his strategic aims that undermined Europe’s faith in US leadership. This was especially so on the question of international law that is central to the European security concept. This was the point at which Europe, with UK, should have realised the need to take more responsibility for the defence of its own region.
The funding restrictions that then resulted from Covid-19 exacerbated the situation.
Trump Mk2 and what to do
When Trump achieved a second term as president, Europe should not have been surprised that he became more assertive and insisted Europe increased its NATO funding or the US would withdraw. The final wakeup call came when he unilaterally started to discuss a ceasefire of the war in Ukraine with Putin, excluding Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the EU. Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron led the response to marshal European leaders to increase their defence and security funding.
Trump’s subsequent actions to temporarily cease Ukraine military support and intelligence, while also stopping offensive cyber operations against Russia, raised questions on whether the USA is a reliable ally in NATO. But military planning for the defence of NATO countries relies on the US nuclear deterrent and airpower.
Here are some ideas of what Europe must do to both repair relations between US and EU and take greater responsibility for Europe’s defence.
First, let’s consider the nuclear deterrent. The number of warheads held by nuclear powers in 2024 showed Russia with 4,380, USA 3,700, France 290 and UK 225. Macron is exploring the option of offering his to cover other EU nations. UK does not need US approval to use its deterrent, but nuclear is only a deterrent if you have enough to allow a second strike. Europe, without the US, does not. President Adrzej Duda of Poland has previously requested US nuclear weapons to be placed in Poland to counter Russia’s 2023 decision to deploy tactical nuclear missiles in Belarus and is warm to Macron’s offer of French weapons. However, we must also reconsider the whole concept of deterrence.
Russia is currently attacking Ukraine’s electrical generation and distribution infrastructure. Should Europe concentrate its efforts on making the crucial energy infrastructure more resilient for all its members?
It must demonstrate to its adversaries that it has the means and the will to defend itself, both within NATO and without. In the 2021 book Future War and the Defence of Europe, by John R Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges et al, the authors say, “Berlin, Paris and London must lead Europeans towards a new concept of deterrence via a range of integrated civilian and military options, tools, governments and institutions, reinforced by diplomacy and constant engagement”. I have hope that prediction can be realised.
Hyperwar and technology
A future war in Europe will be a hyperwar. It will happen very fast using a plethora of systems across domains to overcome an adversary’s defence. It will be driven by advances in technology, with artificial intelligence at the core. This applies to ‘the internet of things’ such as military platforms, the intelligence they receive and the drones they control. It also applies to military defence systems and closer working with industry to introduce innovative technologies to the front line more rapidly.
There are two programmes involving European nations in developing sixth generation ‘fighter’ aircraft to replace the F35 in the 2030s. The Global Combat Aircraft Programme by UK, Italy and Japan and the Future Combat Air System by France Germany and Spain. Both are in the early concept development stage with initial options as a larger aircraft with longer range, standoff missiles and greater use of AI and fusion of data from multiple sources.
The US Defence Advanced Research Programme DARPA is researching the use of such an aircraft as a command and control platform in a ‘system of systems’ allowing use of recoverable drones and inexpensive cruise missiles. This enables faster capability updates with open architecture and interchangeable modules. See DARPA looks at ‘system of systems’ to maintain US air superiority as an example of how technology will change future warfare with computerized data fusion of land, sea and space platforms
A new partnership of industry and government is needed to allow earlier involvement of equipment suppliers in discussions on emerging security and defence needs. This will encourage innovation and adaptation of off the shelf hardware and software to provide affordable, leading edge, and timely capability. This is what is being discussed now by the military leaders of the ‘coalition of the willing’ who have been mustered in Europe for the defence of Ukraine. But it needs time, and a lot of new investment..
What about Türkiye?
Türkiye has an active-duty army of 350,000, and is a member of NATO with long aspirations for a closer relationship with Europe but has so far remained neutral in dealings between Ukraine and Russia. Türkiye’s geographical position between east and west with control of entrance to the Black Sea suggest it could be an acceptable mediator over conflicts in this historically sensitive region. See YouTube video on this.
