Donald Trump’s sudden departure from the G7 summit for “much bigger things” was accompanied by an ominous warning about Iran. Clearly frustrated by Israel’s continued bombardment of Iran, leading to no response on whether they would cease enrichment of uranium that could be used in a nuclear weapon. What followed was a carefully planned and executed attack on Iran’s underground enrichment facilities with GBU-57 “bunker busting” 30,000lb bombs dropped from B2 stealth bombers. He immediately claimed it as a total success, even before a full battle damage assessment had been made.
We await a full assessment on whether Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon was “obliterated”. Had they moved the 400kgs of enriched uranium? Do their scientists still know the process? The International Atomic Energy Agency believes the centrifuges were severely damaged by the bombs’ vibrations, but not totally and they should be able to restart enrichment in a “matter of months”. Iran has suspended resumption of their inspections needed to confirm. Iran’s response was a limited attack on an US airbase in Qatar and military installation in Iraq, possibly a signal they don’t intend to escalate the situation. Trump demanded that Iran give up any domestic enrichment, and instead go to some kind of regional consortium, where they would import the nuclear fuel. Iran insisted they will continue to enrich uranium.
Trump’s view is that he completed the plan started during his first term. In January 2017, he thought Iran was cheating on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed by the US, UK, France, Germany, China, Russia and Iran in July 2015, to limit Iran’s ambitions to build nuclear weapons. Israel agreed with his concerns, and the US withdrew from JCPOA in May 2018, declaring new sanctions on Iran. The European Commission disagreed, as they wished to continue trading with Iran to keep diplomatic relations open.
NATO summit and ‘peace in our time’
My initial reaction to the NATO summit was that there was a change in emphasis in the previous 24 hours. Trump’s late arrival and a shortened session was focused on telling him what he wanted to hear, despite members having no time to review their defence strategies. This reminded me of ‘peace in our time’, the speech made by Neville Chamberlain on 30 September 1938, appeasing Hitler, and fuelled by antiwar sentiments after the great depression.
We’re now suffering the financial slump of 2008, effects of Covid and the invasion of changed Ukraine. But Trump is told that NATO members agree to increase military budgets to a total of 5% GDP by 2035. This is in stark contrast to national statements recently, especially Spain who insists it can only allocate 2.1%. This questions credibility of national estimates and plans for outer years. 2029 is given for a review “in light of the strategic environment (threat from Russia?) and updated Capability Targets”.
Read the Hague Summit Declaration here.
Since the NATO Summit Trump has put a pause on any further military equipment to Ukraine, some of which is already in Poland awaiting delivery. He cites the need to preserve US war stocks while also considering selling Patriot missiles to Germany for transfer to Ukraine. He also says he had a phone call with Putin who continues to bombard Ukraine nightly and refuses to consider a ceasefire until the “root causes” are on the agenda.
What’s needed now?
The first lesson of history is that a totally integrated European Defence Force is not possible unless there is deeper political integration first. This is unlikely when the EU allows nations such as Hungary, who openly flouts its rules and principles. EU nations wish to preserve some sovereignty, while pooling some for the benefits of strength in numbers. Europe, probably led by UK, France and Germany, must decide what and where increased defence and security investment is needed. It must then negotiate a new agreement with NATO and America that relies less on US support, but recognises that a reformed Atlantic alliance is also needed for the defence of America.
The UK currently fills the NATO post of deputy supreme allied commander Europe, having created an agreed European military capability that maximises common standards, is adaptable to new threats and can be rapidly mobilised. It must then put aside national and commercial interests to allocate leadership for development of each element to avoid duplication. There will be many organisational aspects of NATO that will not need reformation, but a review of article five may be timely. What is an attack? Does it include a major cyberattack, an attack on critical infrastructure or a swarm of drones?
Europe and its allies should also reserve the right to make their own trading agreements, possibly with the CPTPP, now chaired by Australia, that is suggested by Ursula von der Leyen.
It’s time to stand up to bullies, be they Putin or Trump.
What is still not clear?
Despite the strategic defence review (SDR) stating that UK maritime and air forces are its forte, changes briefed at the NATO Summit increased uncertainty about plans for them to operate together as the UK Integrated Air and Missile Defence. This has raised many parliamentary questions, the answers to which have not clarified plans and funding, especially beyond 2029. Some examples are given below.
First is the new plan to buy a mix of 12 F35A and 27 more F35B fighters. The initial indication was that F35As, along with the 74 bought by Germany, would add to the French air-launched nuclear capability. However, the argument now is that the UK F35As will be used as trainers, likely due to RAF Voyager tankers being unable to refuel F35A, and the fact that the use of external fuel tanks destroys the stealth capability needed for nuclear missions.
The first training priority is to replace the Hawk T2 trainer that is the core problem of the training pipeline due to ongoing engine reliability. An adaptable European design that can be shared with other nations is an option for consideration.
More important is the transition to 6th generation GCAP fighter and Typhoon replacement with its associated drones. Ideally this should be capable of use by both RAF and RN on land or aircraft carriers, but midlife updates are needed for the two carriers to fit an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS).
The RAF also operate the E7 Wedgetail airborne warning and control aircraft that the US are now considering replacement by a satellite-based system. The RN needs a replacement for the helicopter-based Crowsnest organic AEW radar; the MQ-98 Protector drone is being considered, as it can fly much higher. Development cost estimates vary between £0.5bn and £1.5bn.
There are other medium-term issues that need clarification on plans and costings. For example, the optimum distribution of littoral, long range strike missiles amongst ship types, including modified Type 23 and Type 45, and whether energy-based weapons can be deployed in uncrewed vessels.
The UK SDR was a national document, but the NATO summit changed the goalposts. The UK now needs a revised roadmap of the internal changes it now needs to make, including new defence industrial strategy, MoD and research agency changes. However, it also needs further discussion with its European partners to formulate what Europe needs and can, collectively, deliver.
What were the main drivers of change?
First, cyber or information warfare. Why use military force if you can achieve your aims without firing a bullet? Tetiana Toma’s recent article, From troll farms to politicians Russia’s ‘conquest’ of European minds, expresses how deep and wide this threat is. I might add “how long since they conquered Trump’s mind?”
The UK SDR says that “by the end of 2025, the MOD should establish an initial operating capability for a new CyberEM Command within Strategic Command. It should act as a hub, integrating the full range of military operations and bringing coherence to how defence understands, develops, and accesses capability with allies and industry. It should be largely filled by a mixture of civilians and reserves, given that greater expertise exists in the civilian sector.“
Second, the simple drone. Mass produced anywhere, cheap, and easily adaptable to new threats. My mind jumps back to production of the Spitfire in world war two, wherein the Luftwaffe learnt where the main British factories were, and started bombing them. Thus, production moved to various unlikely places around the country, metallic items were collected to be melted down, and civilian youngsters and women were sent to work secretly in these “shadow factories”. Could this be repeated in several ‘start-up’ companies?
It was Winston Churchill who, on 5 March 1946, coined the phrase “Iron Curtain” to predict that a new conflict was pending to separate the East and the West in a Cold War.
Four years later they started to build it.
In May last year, Finland, Norway, Poland and the Baltic countries agreed to build a ‘drone wall’ to help defend their borders with Russia. Finland has the longest border with Russia at 1,340kms, and it is estimated that it needs to be 3,600kms to extend it to southern Europe.
Facing the challenges together
I have naturally focused on the uncertainties that change daily in the 21st century. John Maynard Keynes said that, when confronting the new, the difficulty is to abandon the old. Europe’s peace depends on a new transatlantic relationship and Europeans working better together to secure it. This is the start of facing the challenges together that will result in a stronger Europe.
Let me leave you with a project that is going well: the Type 26 anti-submarine frigate that, at 8,000 tonnes, is more of a destroyer, can take two Merlin helicopters, which are the most advanced anti-submarine helicopters in the world, and has an adaptable design for future capability changes. Hopefully also for export potential.
