The April 2026 parliamentary elections in Hungary will be a pivotal moment for democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Hungary and for the entire European Union. Despite the lead of the opposition party in opinion polls, there is no guarantee that they can win the elections. People fear that the elections will be marred by grave violations of both domestic and international standards for democratic elections.
Is the hope for the end of Orbán’s rule misplaced?
In my April 2025 article on Orbán’s illiberal democracy in Hungary, the last paragraph had the subtitle ‘New hope from Tisza’.
The newly established party Tisza (both the name of a river and an abbreviation for respect and freedom) gives Orbán’s opponents hope. It is led by Peter Magyar, a former Orbán supporter. In most opinion polls, his party overtakes Orbán by 6 to 10 points. The April election might bring about the much-hoped-for change. If so, Tisza promises to:
Create real social peace and bury the artificially created separation between Hungarians and Hungarians. Step by step, brick by brick we take back our country and together we will build a new, peaceful. modern, European, democratic and liveable Hungary.
(Translated by the author)
A new dawn may be in the offing, but like his mate across the Atlantic, Trump, Orbán will not go quietly. The opposition’s popularity and enthusiasm are not the only factors that may influence the outcome of the elections. As Tisza has appointed several very competent candidates for its future parliamentary posts and has just published its manifesto, Orbán has strengthened his so-called Solidarity Law. This bans and criminalises international organisations that receive foreign funding. Orbán has just made the prosecution apply retrospectively.
Tisza faces structural disadvantages: a biased electoral system, the abuse of state resources and distortion of the information environment.
April’s elections will have an impact on the whole of Europe and beyond
The Hungarian national elections will have a much wider impact than one might expect from a country of around 9.6 million people. If the opposition party were to win, the country could finally free itself from the 15-year rule of the autocratic PM Orbán. His Fidesz party-led government aligns itself more with Putin and Trump than with neighbouring democratic countries like Austria and Poland.
Orbán has turned Hungary into an illiberal democracy, and for the first time, it looks like the population has had enough. They seem ready to stand up against the lies, the corruption and the hateful propaganda of the regime, turning Hungarians against each other. The opposition party Tisza promises to make Hungary a ‘liveable’ country. Currently, 7% of Hungarian young people live and work abroad. Tisza hopes that these people will want to stay at home to help build a prosperous, free Hungary.
Orbán in the EU
In Insight by the Centre for European Reform (CER), Zselyke Csaky, a senior research fellow, analyses the various scenarios, stating:
The stakes of the election could not be higher: if Orbán wins, Hungary will continue its slide into autocracy domestically and will keep blocking joint action at the EU level.
The result of the elections will have a major impact on EU policy. Orbán has been vetoing EU decisions, often making vital progress impossible.
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For example, the two biggest EU importers of Russian oil, Hungary and Slovakia (note: with a right-wing PM, Fico), have contributed well over £10bn to the Kremlin’s war effort. In addition, Orbán has repeatedly used the threat of his veto to hinder the progress in Ukraine’s EU accession talks. Orbán’s Putin-friendly stance remains a significant obstacle to European attempts to forge a unified and effective strategy for supporting Kyiv and strengthening its hand in any future peace negotiations.
Free but not fair elections
International observations led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have classified the 2022 elections in Hungary as ‘free but not fair’. They are ‘free’ in the sense that most citizens can cast a vote for a party or candidate of their choice. However, they are not ‘fair’ due to a grossly distorted media environment, which is dominated by pro-government outlets.
There is also a pervasive overlap between the state apparatus, the government and the ruling party Fidesz. State resources, including public funds and government infrastructure, are used for partisan campaigning. Gerrymandering and last-minute legal changes to electoral rules also systematically tilt the playing field towards Fidesz despite the absence of overt ballot-box fraud.
I previously wrote an article about the decline of free media in Hungary, with main radio and TV stations in government-friendly hands. Rural communities, especially the elderly population, depend on these media for their news. Very few speak another language, making it easy to indoctrinate them with government propaganda. Young people move to urban areas and are more likely to speak German or English. They also get information from the internet, where there are still some independent media channels, like Kontroll and Partizán. Tisza hopes that young people will speak to their parents and grandparents about how the government spreads dis- and misinformation and what repercussions another Orbán win would have for the country.
Why the opposition might not win despite leading in the polls
The Hungarian Observer, an English-language independent Hungarian paper, examines why the Tisza party’s current polling lead may not translate into a parliamentary majority in Hungary. Despite holding a significant lead, experts suggest Tisza needs to win by 6–8 percentage points just to secure a majority due to an electoral system heavily tilted in favour of Orbán’s incumbent Fidesz party.
The structural hurdles to overcome are:
- Pro-majoritarian ‘winner compensation’
- Fidesz restructured the voting system to favour the winners of individual districts.
- Surplus votes: Under ‘winner compensation’, a party can transfer votes exceeding the number needed to win a district towards their national party list.
- Constituency shift: The share of MPs elected from single-member districts was increased to 53%, amplifying the ‘winner-takes-all’ effect.
- Fidesz restructured the voting system to favour the winners of individual districts.
- Gerrymandering and reapportionment
- Fidesz has manipulated district boundaries to maximise its seat count:
- Seat reallocation: In 2024, the opposition stronghold of Budapest lost two seats, while the Fidesz-leaning Pest County gained two.
- Rural bias: Urban districts (opposition-heavy) contain more voters than rural districts (Fidesz-heavy). This allows Fidesz to win more seats with a lower total vote share.
- Fidesz has manipulated district boundaries to maximise its seat count:
- Ethnic and minority votes
- Fidesz utilises specific demographics to secure marginal seats:
- Ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries can vote by mail, a privilege not extended to other Hungarians abroad. In 2022, this provided two extra seats for Fidesz.
- Domestic minorities: Fidesz likely leverages reserved seats for Romani and German minorities to secure additional loyal MPs.
- Fidesz utilises specific demographics to secure marginal seats:
- The ‘kingmaker’ risk
- The 5% parliamentary entry threshold for parties creates high unpredictability:
- Mi Hazánk: This far-right party is polling around 5%. If it enters parliament, it could become a ‘kingmaker’.
- Fidesz alignment: As a ‘satellite party’ with ideological ties to Fidesz, Mi Hazánk would likely cooperate with the incumbents rather than Tisza, potentially keeping Fidesz in power even if they lose the popular vote.
- The 5% parliamentary entry threshold for parties creates high unpredictability:
Can the opposition restore democracy?
Even if the opposition overcomes the above hurdles, it will be a difficult task to restore the country’s democracy. Economic growth has stagnated and public services suffered from lack of investment. Tisza promises to improve health care and education while addressing the cost of living crisis.
However, Orbán had 15 years to capture key institutions and to appoint loyalists to long-term positions. Even if Tisza should win with a two-thirds majority, Fidesz has several options to paralyse the work of the new government, which will be faced with Orbán’s family and friends, i.e. oligarchs who became rich through government contracts and corruption. The opposition promises to join the EU Court of Justice to support its efforts to deal with the decades-long misuse of EU funds.
As CER writes,
Whatever the outcome, the EU will have a pivotal role to play. If the opposition wins, it can serve as an anchor – this will be important given the depth of institutional capture in Hungary and the likelihood that any new government will lack the supermajority needed for comprehensive reforms. The EU should maintain pressure to uphold democratic standards and provide tangible support for restoration efforts, while recognising that the process will be lengthy and fraught with legal and political traps set by Fidesz.
At the same time, Brussels must prepare for the possibility that Orbán remains in power …. It will need to face Hungary’s disruptive behaviour head-on – before forthcoming elections, such as the French vote in 2027, bring additional obstructionist governments into power.
